INTRODUCTION
Network design is a fundamental problem in computer science and operations research. This line of research assumes a central authority that constructs the network and has various optimization criteria to fulfill. In practice, however, many networks are actually formed by selfish players who are motivated by their own interests and their own objective function. The Internet, networks for exchanging goods, and social networks, for instance, are all formed by many players and not by a single authority. This motivates the research of network creation by multiple selfish players.
In this work, we focus on the latter model and allow individual users to decide which edges to buy. The appropriate concept for studying such a scenario is that of Nash equilibria [Nash 1951 ], where no user has the incentive to deviate from his strategy. We analyze the performance of the resulting network architectures using the price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in their seminal paper [2009] . Over the last years, Nash equilibria and their associated price of anarchy have been studied for a wide range of classical computer problems, such as job scheduling, routing, facility location, and, last but not least, network design and creation (see, e.g., [Anshelevich et al. 2008a [Anshelevich et al. , 2008b Bala and Goyal 2000; Correa et al. 2004; Czumaj and Vöcking 2007; Czumaj et al. 2002; Fabrikant et al. 2003; Fotakis et al. 2009; Haller and Sarangi 2003; Jain and Vazirani 2001; Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 2009; Roughgarden and Tardos 2002] ). The analyses also address a variant of the price of anarchy, called the price of stability [Anshelevich et al. 2008a [Anshelevich et al. , 2008b Correa et al. 2004] .
In this article, we study a network creation game introduced by Fabrikant et al. [2003] . The game is defined as follows. There are n players, each of which is associated with a separate network vertex. These players have to build a connected, undirected graph. Each player may lay down edges to other players. Once the edges are installed, they are regarded as undirected and may be used in both directions. The resulting network is the set of players (vertices) and the union of all edges laid out. The cost of each player consists of two components. First, a player pays an edge building cost equal to α times the number of edges laid out by him, for some α > 0. Second, the player incurs a connection cost equal to the sum of the shortest path distances to other players. This game models scenarios in which peers wish to communicate and transfer data. Each peer incurs a hardware cost and pays for the communication delays to other players.
Formally, we represent the set of players by a vertex set V = {1, . . . , n}. A strategy of a player v ∈ V is a set of vertices S v ⊆ V \ {v} such that v creates an edge to every w ∈ S v . (Note that we consider only pure strategies of the players.) Given a joint strategy S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ), the resulting graph G( S) = (V, E) consists of the edge set E = v∈V w∈S v {v, w}. In our analysis, it will sometimes be convenient to assume that the edges have a direction. A directed edge (v, w) indicates that the player v built an edge to w. The cost of a player v under S is Cost(v, S) = α|S v |+ w∈V,w =v δ (v, w) , where
δ(v, w) is the length of the shortest path between v and w in G( S). If there exists no path from v to w, then δ(v, w) = ∞.
A joint strategy S forms a Nash equilibrium if, for any player v ∈ V and any other joint strategy U that differ from S onl y in v's strategy, Cost(v, S) ≤ Cost(v, U) . The induced graph G( S) is called the equilibrium graph. S is a strict Nash equilibrium if, for every player v ∈ V and joint strategy U differing from S only in v's component, strict inequality Cost (v, S) < Cost(v, U) holds. Otherwise, it is a weak Nash equilibrium. In a weak Nash equilibrium, at least one player can change its strategy without affecting its cost. We will also use the notion of transient Nash equilibria [Fabrikant et al. 2003] . A transient Nash equilibrium is a weak equilibrium from which there exists a sequence of single-player strategy changes, which do not change the deviator's cost, leading to a non-equilibrium position.
For a joint strategy S, let Cost( S) = v∈V Cost(v, S) be the total cost of all players. Let Cost(OPT) be the cost of the social optimum that achieves the smallest possible value. The price of anarchy is the worst-case ratio Cost( S)/Cost(OPT), taken over all Nash equilibria S.
Previous Work. The main interest of Fabrikant et al. [2003] was to analyze the price of anarchy of the game. They observed that, for α < 2 and α > n 2 , it is constant. Their main contribution is an upper bound of O( √ α) for α ∈ [2, n 2 ]. This upper bound can be as large as O(n) when α = n 2 . Fabrikant et al. pointed out that in their constructions as well as in experiments they performed, they only found tree Nash equilibria. The only exception was the Petersen graph that represents a transient Nash equilibrium. This fact motivated them to formulate a tree conjecture stating that there exists a constant A such that, for any α > A, all nontransient Nash equilibria are trees. In other words, every Nash equilibrium that has a cycle in the induced graph is transient and, in particular, weak. They proved that if the tree conjecture holds, the price of anarchy is constant, for any α.
In an unpublished note, independent of our work, Lin [2003] showed that, for α = O( √ n) and α = (n 3/2 ), the price of anarchy is constant. Corbo and Parkes [2005] studied the price of anarchy in the model introduced by Fabrikant et al. with a (crucial) variation that the edges are not bought by a single player but by both players at the end points of the edge.
Our Contribution. In this article, we first prove that the tree conjecture is incorrect and show that the possible resulting equilibria can have a rich and involved structure. More specifically, we prove that, for any positive integer n 0 , there exists a graph built by n ≥ n 0 players that contains cycles and forms a strict Nash equilibrium, for any α with 1 < α ≤ n/2. The graphs we construct are geodetic, that is, the shortest path between any two vertices is unique, and have a diameter of 2. These properties are crucial in showing that the Nash equilibrium is indeed strict. If a player deviates from its original strategy and builds fewer edges or edges to different players, then (since the original graph was geodetic) the shortest path distance cost increases substantially. If a player decides to build more edges, then (since the graph has diameter 2) the cost saving is negligible. Our construction resorts to some concepts from graph theory and geometry. In particular, we use results on finite affine planes. To the best of our knowledge, these concepts have never been used in game-theoretic investigations and might be helpful when studying other graph-oriented games.
We proceed and give improved upper bounds on the price of anarchy. Our main result here is a constant upper bound on the price of anarchy for both α ∈ O( √ n) and α ≥ 12n log n and a worst-case bound of O(n 1/3 ) instead of O(n). More precisely, we prove that if α ≥ 12n log n , the price of anarchy is not larger than 1.5 and tends to 1 as α increases. Interestingly, the proof shows that if α ≥ 12n log n , any Nash equilibrium is indeed a tree. For any α, we prove an upper bound of O(1 + (min{
, the price of anarchy is again constant. For α ∈ [ √ n, n], the value increases, reaching a maximum of O(n 1/3 ) at α = n. For α > n, the price of anarchy is decreasing.
Furthermore, we analyze the structure of Nash equilibria, investigating solutions with short induced cycles. We prove that any Nash equilibrium that forms a chordal graph having induced cycles of length three is indeed transient. We show that such equilibria do exist for all n. Furthermore, we show that if α < n/2, then the only tree that forms an equilibrium is the star.
Additionally, we study a weighted network creation game in which player v wishes to send a certain amount of traffic to player u, for any v and u. In the cost of player v, the shortest path distance to u is multiplied by this traffic amount. We provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy. Our bound in the weighted case is such that when the traffic amounts are uniform, the bound is asymptotically equal to that of the unweighted game.
Finally, we consider settings with cost sharing, where players can pay for a fraction of an edge. The edge exists if the total contribution by all players is at least α. This setting can be viewed as a cooperative game. We show that in both the unweighted and weighted games, part of our upper bounds on the price of anarchy carry over. We also prove that there exist strict Nash equilibria with cycles in which the cost is split evenly among players.
Related and Subsequent Work. There exists a large body of previous work on other network design games. Anshelevich et al. [2008a] investigate a network design problem where players, in a given graph, have to connect desired terminal pairs. They analyze the quality of the best Nash equilibrium under Shapley cost sharing. A weighted version of this game was studied in depth by Chen and Roughgarden [2009] . Anshelevich et al. [2008b] consider connection games, where each player has to connect a set of terminals and present algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria. Further work on cost sharing in network design has been conducted [Gupta et al. 2008; Jain and Vazirani 2001; Johari et al. 2006; Pál and Tardos 2003 ]. Bala and Goyal [2000] study a network formation problem in which players incur cost but also benefit from building edges to other players. They trade off the costs of forming links against the potential reward from doing so. Haller and Sarangi [2003] build on this work and allow player heterogeneity. More generally, social and economic networks in which each player is a different vertex in the graph play a major role in the economic literature. For a detailed review of social and economics models, see Jackson [2003] .
During the last years, after the conference publication of this article, the network creation game introduced by Fabrikant et al. [2003] and variants thereof have received quite some research interest (see, e.g., [Alon et al. 2010; Andelman et al. 2009; Demaine et al. 2009 Demaine et al. , 2012 Ehsani et al. 2011; Laoutaris et al. 2008; Mihalak and Schlegel 2010; Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz 2010] ). In particular, some of the results presented in this article have been improved. Demaine et al. [2012] showed that the price of anarchy is upper bounded by 2 O( √ log n) , for general α. They also established a constant upper bound if α = O(n 1− ), for any fixed > 0. Mihalak and Schlegel [2010] proved that the price of anarchy is constant for α > 273n. Demaine et al. [2012] also introduced and studied a network formation game in which the cost of a player is defined as α times the number of edges built plus the maximum distance to any other player. Demaine et al. [2009] investigated cooperative network creation games that may be played on a general graph which is not necessarily complete. Further work on cooperative games and the performance of corresponding equilibria was presented by Andelman et al. [2009] and Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [2010] . Halevi and Mansour [2007] consider a network creation game where each player is only interested in its distances to a subset of the players. Ehsani et al. [2011] and Laoutaris et al. [2008] study games where each player has a certain budget to build edges to other players. Alon et al. [2010] proposed an interesting network creation game in which, initially, a graph is given. Then players may swap incident edges.
On Nash Equilibria for a Network Creation Game 2:5
DISPROVING THE TREE CONJECTURE
We present a family of graphs that form strict Nash equilibria and have induced cycles of length three and five. These graphs were also constructed by Blokhuis and Brouwer [1988] as instances of geodetic graphs of diameter two. Blokhuis and Brouwer considered undirected graphs. In this article, we define orientations on the edges and prove that the resulting graphs form indeed strict Nash equilibria.
The construction of the graphs relies on affine planes, a basic concept in geometry. An official reference is the textbook by MacWilliams and Sloane [1978] ; an easily accessible but perhaps less formal reference is the Wikipedia entry. 1 For completeness, we mention the definition of affine planes. We next mention some facts about affine planes. We do not prove any of these facts, as it would be beyond the scope of this article, but instead refer the reader again to MacWilliams and Sloane [1978] . If q is a prime power, then for the field F = GF(q), the sets A = We are now ready to describe the graphs representing strict Nash equilibria. For an affine plane AG(2, q), we define a graph G = (V, E) with V = A ∪ L. In the following, when we refer to a point or a line, we often mean the corresponding vertex or player. The edge set E is specified as follows. There are no self-loops or multiple copies of an edge. We have to give orientations to these edges. Every equivalence class of a line L defines a complete subgraph K q of G. Let r(L) and s(L) denote the indegree and outdegree of L in K q , respectively. One can easily show by induction that there exists an orientation of the edges of K q such that, for every line
In order to define an orientation for the edges between points and lines, we choose a representative line L i , 0 ≤ i ≤ q, for each of the q + 1 equivalence classes. First consider the highest numbered equivalence class. The lines of [L q not build edges to their points; rather the existing edges are built by the points. Next, as for the (mod q) . All the other edges are built by the points. Every point x is contained in a line (x L q ) =: L q j and has exactly two incoming edges from the lines (x L j ) and (x L j−1(mod q) ). For q = 2, we obtain the Petersen graph.
We next consider the graph structure relative to any line L and any point x, respectively. As we have to identify vertices up to a distance of 2, we cannot avoid using subscripts and superscripts in the notation (alternatively, one could use two subscripts). In general, L x will denote a line containing point x. We use subscripts to enumerate lines or points that are related. Figure 1 shows the graph structure relative to a line L ∈ [L q ]. Let x 1 , . . . , x q be the q points contained in L. We number these points such that L builds edges to x 1 and x 2 . Let L 1 , . . . , L q−1 be the q − 1 lines parallel to L. We number these lines such that the first r = r(L) lines build edges to L, while L builds edges to the remaining q − 1 − r lines. For any point
q the other q lines, different from L, that contain x i . These sets of q lines are disjoint for different x i , since for every pair of points, there is a unique line containing this pair. Furthermore, these lines
, then the structure of the graph is the same except that the edges between L and its points are all built by the points.
Figure 2 depicts the graph structure relative to a point x. 
associated with a line L has a different strategy that achieves a cost equal to or smaller than that of L's original one. For α in the range
1 ≤ α ≤ q + 1, L
has no strategy with a smaller cost.
PROOF. We prove the lemma for a line L ∈ [L q ], which builds two edges to points. This implies that the lemma also holds for lines L ∈ [L q ] which do not build edges to points. For, if a line L ∈ [L q ] had a different strategy with the same or a smaller cost, then any line L ∈ [L q ] could adopt the same strategy change while maintaining the two edges built to points. This would result in the same or a smaller cost, respectively. As we will show in the following, this is impossible.
Fix a line L ∈ [L q ]. We consider all possible strategy changes S. First, if L builds l > s + 2 edges, then at best there are l − s − 2 + 2q − 1 vertices at distance 1, while the other vertices are at distance 2 from L. In L's original strategy, there are 2q−1 vertices at distance 1, while all other vertices are at distance 2. Thus, L's original strategy has a cost which is at least α(l−s−2)−(l−s−2) smaller than that of the modified strategy, and this expression is strictly positive for α > 1. Thus buying more than s + 2 edges does not pay off.
In the remainder of this proof, we study the case in which L builds at most s + 2 edges and starts with the strategy S 0 in which L does not build any edges at all. The resulting shortest path tree of L is given in Figure 3 . 2:8
... 3 ≤ j ≤ q. Finally, points x 1 and x 2 are a distance of 4 away from L, because these points are only contained in lines L
q , respectively, at distance 3. The cost difference between S 0 and L's original strategy is −(s + 2)α + s(q + 1) + 2q + 6 = (q + 1 − α)(s + 2) + 4 > 0, and hence S 0 is a worse strategy.
Next suppose that L does build edges. The edges can be of six different types: L builds an edge to (a) a line L
In the following we investigate all of these cases, which are also depicted in Figure 4 .
q , which is linked to x 1 , and to one line from L q . From there, x 1 and x 2 can be reached. Relative to S 0 , by laying out an edge to x i j , line L saves a shortest-path distance cost of 1 on its connections to x i j and the lines and points just mentioned. Hence L saves a cost of 5 relative to S 0 and hence a cost of at most 5 relative to any other strategy. Again, a removal of this link can increase the shortest-path distance cost by at most 5. q . From there, x 1 and x 2 can be reached. Hence in building an edge to x i j , line L saves a shortest-path distance cost of 2 for the connection to x i j and a cost of 1 for each of the connections to the other lines/points mentioned. Thus the total cost saving is 6 relative to S 0 . An omission of this edge results in a cost increase of at most 6.
Case (c).
The last two cases are studied under the condition that the other edges built by L are also of type (e) or (f).
Case (e).
If L builds only edges of type (e) and (f), then without the link to L i , this line is still at a distance of 2, and the points x i 1 , . . . , x i q are still at distance 3. By setting the link to L i , line L can reduce the shortest-path distance cost by q + 1.
Case (f). Again, assume that L builds only edges of type (e) and (f). Without an edge
q are a distance of 3 away from L, and x 1 is a distance of 4 away. Building an edge to x 1 reduces the shortest-path distance cost by q + 3.
With these case distinctions (a)-(f), we are able to finish the proof. Recall that L builds at most s + 2 edges. If strategy S contains edges of types (a)-(d), then we simultaneously replace all of these edges by edges of type (e) or (f). Any such edge replacement increases the shortest-path distance cost by at most 6 or s + 5, while the decrease is at least q + 1. Since, for q > 10, we have q + 1 > q/2 + 6 ≥ s + 5 ≥ 6, strategy S is worse than L's strategy defined by graph G. So suppose that S only builds edges of types (e) or (f). If S builds less than s + 2 edges, then we introduce additional edges of types (e) or (f) until a total of s + 2 edges are laid out. For any additional edge, there is an edge building cost of α, while the shortest-path distance cost decreases by at least q + 1. If α < q + 1, there is a net cost saving, and S is worse than L's original strategy given by G. If α = q + 1, then L's original strategy is at least as good. LEMMA 2.3. Let q > 10. For α in the range 1 < α ≤ q + 1, no player associated with a point x has a different strategy that achieves a cost equal to or smaller than that of x's original strategy. For α = 1, no player associated with a point has a strategy that achieves a smaller cost.
PROOF. Consider an arbitrary point x. We study all possible strategy changes. If x builds l > q − 1 edges, then at best there are l + 2 vertices at distance 1 and the remaining vertices at distance 2. In x's original strategy, there are q + 1 vertices at distance 1, while the other vertices are at distance 2. The cost difference between the new and old strategy is (l − (q − 1))α − (l − (q − 1)), and this value is strictly positive if α > 1 and zero if α = 1.
In the following, we assume that x builds at most q − 1 edges and first investigate strategy S 0 in which x does not build any edges. The new graph relative to x is shown in Figure 5 . Any line L i j , with 3 ≤ i ≤ q + 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ q − 1, is at distance 3 from 2:10
...
... x, because these lines are not connected to L x 1 or L x 2 but are each connected to one point from x 1 1 , . . . , x 1 q−1 and to one point from x 2 1 , . . . , x 2 q−1 . Similarly, any point x i j , with
, is at distance 4 from x. This is because this line does not contain points x 1 j or x 2 j , for j = 1, . . . , q − 1, and is not parallel to lines
. Furthermore, let x denote the points not equal to x, x 1 i , and
The cost difference between S 0 and the original strategy of x in G is −(q − 1)α + 2(q − 1) 2 + 3(q − 1) = (q − 1)(2q + 1 − α) > 0, and hence S 0 is worse.
Next consider a strategy S that builds edges to vertices not contained in L x . These edges can be of four different types: x builds an edge to (a) a point x 1 j or x 2 j , for some
The different cases are depicted in Figure 6 . We investigate how many additional vertices at distance 2 point x can reach compared to S 0 . We remark that in x's original strategy, each link to a line L x i , 3 ≤ i ≤ q + 1, gives 2(q − 1) such vertices.
Case (a).
We analyze an edge to x 1 j . This point is connected to exactly one line from 
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Case (b).
We consider an edge to L 1 j . This line is connected to exactly one point from x i 1 , . . . , x i q−1 , for any 3 ≤ i ≤ q + 1, but no further lines from L or L x . Thus at best q − 1 additional vertices at distance 2 can be reached.
and to exactly one point from x i 1 , . . . , x i q−1 , for any 3 ≤ i ≤ q + 1 with i = j. This gives a total of at most 2q − 3 extra vertices at distance 2.
Case (d).
Suppose that x belongs to L x j , 3 ≤ j ≤ q + 1. Thus x is connected to L x j and to exactly one line from L i 1 , . . . , L i q−1 , for any 3 ≤ i ≤ q + 1 with i = j. The number of new vertices at a distance of 2 is q − 1.
We conclude that if S builds k edges of types (a)-(d), then compared to S 0 , less than 2(q − 1)k additional vertices at distance 2 can be reached by x. Now, if S builds a total of l, l < q − 1 edges, then there must be at least (q − 1 − l)2(q − 1) edges at distance 3 from x. The cost difference relative to the original strategy of x in G is The preceding two lemmata yield the main result of this section.
THEOREM 2.4. Let q > 10. The graph G is a strict Nash equilibrium, for 1 < α < q + 1, and a Nash equilibrium, for 1 ≤ α ≤ q + 1.
IMPROVED BOUNDS FOR THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
We first consider the case that α ≥ 12n log n and prove a constant price of anarchy. Then we address the remaining range of α. In both cases, for a given equilibrium graph G( S), we need the concept of a shortest path tree T(u) rooted at a certain vertex u. The root of T(u) is vertex u, and this vertex represents layer 0 of the tree. Given vertex layers 0 to i − 1, layer i is constructed as follows. A node w belongs to layer i if it is not yet contained in layers 0 to i − 1, and there is a vertex v in layer i − 1 such that there is an edge connecting v and w, that is, {v, w} ∈ E. We add this edge to the shortest-path tree. We emphasize that if w is linked to several vertices of layer i − 1, only one such edge is added to the tree at this point. Suppose that all vertices of V have been added to T(u) in this fashion. The edges inserted so far are referred to as tree edges. We now add all remaining edges of E to T(u) and refer to these edges as non-tree edges. Essentially, T(u) is just a layered version of G with distinguished tree edges.
Constant Price of Anarchy for α ≥ 12n log n
In order to establish a constant price of anarchy, we prove that if α ≥ 12n log n , then every Nash equilibrium graph is a tree. This implies an upper bound of 5 on the price of anarchy [Fabrikant et al. 2003 ]. However, we here give an improved upper bound of 1.5 for the considered range of α.
Our proof has the following structure. Given an equilibrium graph whose girth (i.e., the length of a shortest cycle in the graph) is greater than 12 log n , we prove that the graph diameter is less than 6 log n . The proof is by contradiction. We assume that there exists a vertex u with eccentricity (i.e., greatest shortest-path distance to any other vertex) at least 6 log n and examine its shortest-path tree T(u). We show that the maximal depth of T(u) is less than 6 log n . This immediately implies that the equilibrium graph is a tree, given the lower bound on the girth. We complete the proof by showing that for high edge costs, the graph has a high girth. We classify the vertices of the equilibrium graph according to their location in the tree T(u). We refer to the vertices at depth of exactly 6 log n as vertices in the boundary level. We classify the vertices in the levels above the boundary level according to the number of descendents their children have in the boundary level. We have three types of vertices. The first are expanding vertices that lead to an exponential growth, the second and most problematic are neutral vertices that do not lead to a growth but have descendants in the boundary level, and the third are degenerate vertices that have no descendants in the boundary level. The vertices of the boundary level and at levels of larger depth are unclassified. We now give the formal definition.
Definition 3.1. Let G( S) be an equilibrium graph and let u ∈ V. Let T(u) be a shortest-path tree rooted at u. We say that a vertex v ∈ V, at a depth smaller than 6 log n in T(u), is as follows. An example to this classification is given in Figure 7 . Note that vertices at level 6 log n (the boundary level) and higher levels are not classified. Our goal is to show that there are n vertices in the boundary level. This implies that there are no vertices in levels higher than 6 log n . It is important to note that, since the graph has girth greater than 12 log n , there is a unique tree T(u) up to level 6 log n (the boundary level).
In the next lemma, we show that degenerate children of a neutral vertex v and their descendants are connected only through v to vertices out of the subtree of v in T(u).
LEMMA 3.2. Let G( S) be an equilibrium graph whose girth is greater than 12 log n . Let v be a neutral vertex in T(u), and let D u (v) be the set of its degenerate children and their descendants in T(u). Every path from x
∈ D u (v) to y ∈ V \ D u (v) in G( S) must go through v.
PROOF. Consider any z ∈ D u (v).
Vertex z is degenerate. First observe that in the equilibrium graph, there does not exist any edge connecting z to a vertex located in a level numbered higher than 6 log n in T(u), since otherwise, T(u) would not be a shortest-path tree. Furthermore, in the equilibrium graph, there does not exist any edge connecting z to a vertex located in a level numbered at most 6 log n , since otherwise, the girth would be at most 12 log n . These two facts imply that any vertex x ∈ D u (v) can only reach vertices y ∈ V \ D u (v) on paths going through v.
Lemma 3.2 shows that neutral vertices play a crucial role in connecting degenerate vertices. The next lemma will use this property to show that although many neutral vertices can be found in the tree, the number of times that two neutral vertices can appear consecutively on a path from u is limited.
LEMMA 3.3. Let G( S) be an equilibrium graph whose girth is greater than 12 log n . Given a shortest-path tree T(u) rooted at u, let u
= w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w l = v
be a shortest path from u to v in T(u). An edge on the path is said to be a neutral edge if both of its endpoints are neutral vertices. The total number of neutral edges is at most 2 log n .
PROOF. Let (w i−1 , w i ) be a neutral edge on the path from u to v. There are two possible types of neutral edges. Edges that are bought by their tail (i.e., w i−1 ) and edges that are bought by their head (i.e., w i ). We assume without loss of generality that the number of edges which are bought by their tail is at least as large as the number of edges which are bought by their head. We bound the total number of such neutral edges by log n . This gives the desired bound of 2 log n .
Let
be the neutral edges on the path that are bought by their tail. We show that m ≤ log n . Let D u (w i j ) be the set of all the degenerate children of w i j and their descendants. By Lemma 3.2, every path from a vertex in V \ D u (w i j ) to a vertex in D u (w i j ) goes through w i j . For any j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m−1, let n j denote the cardinality of D u (w i j ) ∪ {w i j }. Set n m := 2, which intuitively is the cardinality of the set consisting of w i m and one of its descendants at level of at most 6 log n . Now since we are in equilibrium, for any j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, the benefit of w i j −1 from buying the edge (w i j −1 , w i j ) is at least as large as the benefit from buying the edge (w i j −1 , w i j +1 ). Thus, n j ≥ m k=j+1 n k , for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. As a result, n j ≥ 2 m−j , and the number of vertices in the subtree rooted at w i 1 is at least m j=1 n j ≥ 2 m . We conclude that m is upper bounded by log n .
Based on Lemma 3.3, we prove the main result of this section. We show that every equilibrium graph whose girth is greater than 12 log n must be a tree whose diameter is less than 6 log n .
LEMMA 3.4. If G( S) is an equilibrium graph whose girth is greater than 12 log n , then the diameter of G( S) is less than 6 log n , and G( S) is a tree.
PROOF. For the sake of contradiction, we start by assuming that the diameter is at least 6 log n . Let u ∈ V be a vertex on one of the endpoints of the diameter. We consider a shortest-path tree rooted at u. Since u is one of the diameter endpoints, our assumption implies that u is either a neutral or expanding vertex. We show that, the number of descendants at the boundary level (i.e., vertices at a depth of exactly 6 log n ) is at least n. As it is not possible to have n vertices in the boundary level, we obtain a contradiction. This implies that the maximal depth is less than 6 log n and, additionally, that there are no cycles, since any such cycle would have a girth of at most 12 log n .
For any v ∈ V, we denote with d the depth of v in T(u) and with b the number of neutral edges on the path from u to v. We label a vertex by (d, b) . −(2 log n −0) ≥ n, thus proving the claim will lead to the desired contradiction.
The proof will be by a backwards induction on d and b. As for the induction basis, we show that N(6 log n , b) ≥ 2 −(2 log n −b) and N(d, 2 log n ) ≥ 2 6 log n −d 2
. We first show that N(6 log n , b) ≥ 2 −(2 log n −b) . The only descendent at the boundary level is the vertex itself and N(6 log n , b) = 1. Thus, we need to show that 2 −(2 log n −b) ≤ 1. This follows directly from Lemma 3.3, since b ≤ 2 log n . Next, we prove that N(d, 2 log n ) ≥ 2 6 log n −d 2
. The proof here is a bit more subtle, and a secondary induction on d is needed. The basis for the secondary induction, N(6 log n , 2 log n ) ≥ 1, trivially holds. We assume that N(d , 2 log n ) ≥ 2 6 log n −d 2 for every even d > d and prove it for an even d. Let v be a vertex at an even depth d with b = 2 log n , which may be either expanding or neutral. We show that in either case, v has at least two descendants at depth d + 2 which are either expanding or neutral. For the case that v is expanding, it follows from the definition of expanding vertex that v has at least two descendants at depth d + 2 which are either expanding or neutral. For the case that v is neutral, it follows that v cannot have a neutral child, since b = 2 log n , and there are at most 2 log n neutral edges by Lemma 3.3. Thus, v must have an expanding child, which again has by definition at least two children which are either expanding or neutral. We conclude that in both cases, that is, v is expanding or neutral, it has at least two descendants at depth d + 2 which are either expanding or neutral. The induction hypothesis holds for these descendants of v (recall that we assume it only for even values of d), and we get
This completes the proof of the basis of the primary induction. We assume the induction hypothesis holds for every even d > d and every b > b. Let v be a vertex at an even depth d with b neutral edges on the path from u. Let w be a child of v. There are four possibilities: both v and w are expanding, v is expanding and w is neutral, v is neutral and w is expanding, and both v and w are neutral. In the first three possibilities, as we already discussed, v has at least two descendants at depth d + 2 which are either expanding or neutral, and thus the induction hypothesis holds for them, and we have
In the fourth case in which both v and w are neutral, there is one more neutral edge, and we have
This concludes the proof.
So far, the only assumption that we used in our proofs on the equilibrium graph is that its girth is greater than 12 log n . The next lemma relates the girth of an equilibrium graph to the edge cost α.
LEMMA 3.5. Let G( S) be an equilibrium graph and c be any positive constant. If α ≥ cn log n , then the girth of G( S) is greater than c log n .
PROOF. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the length of a shortest cycle is at most c log n , and consider a vertex u on the cycle that buys a cycle edge. The benefit of u from this edge is at most (c log n − 1)n, which is strictly less than cn log n ≤ α, the cost of an edge. Therefore, the given graph is not an equilibrium graph, and we obtain a contradiction.
We are ready to state our main results, which is a characterization of every Nash equilibrium and a constant price of anarchy whenever α ≥ 12n log n . THEOREM 3.6. For α ≥ 12n log n , the price of anarchy is bounded by 1 + 6n log n α ≤ 1.5, and any equilibrium graph is a tree.
PROOF. Consider any equilibrium graph. The fact that the graph is a tree follows from Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.4. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.4, the diameter is at most 6 log n . Therefore, the cost of the equilibrium graph is bounded by α(n − 1) + 6n(n − 1) log n . The social cost of the optimum, a star graph, is α(n − 1) + 2(n − 1) 2 . Hence the price of anarchy is bounded by
Improved Upper Bound for α < 12n log n
We give a new upper bound for α < 12n log n . In fact, the following theorem holds for any α and is stated in this general form so that it can be generalized to a weighted game in Section 5. Furthermore, it implies a constant upper bound for α = O( √ n).
THEOREM 3.7. Let α > 0. For any Nash equilibrium S, the price of anarchy is bounded by
PROOF. Consider an arbitrary Nash equilibrium N = S, and let G( S) = (V, E) be the corresponding equilibrium graph. We assume that |V| = n > 1, since otherwise, if n = 1, the edge set is empty and the price of anarchy is 1. Given a shortest-path tree T(u) and a vertex v, let (v) be the index of the layer v belonging to in T(u). We need the following lemma. PROOF. We first observe that any non-tree edge connects vertices of the same layer or of adjacent layers: if there was an edge linking a vertex x of layer i to a vertex x of layer j, with j ≥ i + 2, then x would rather belong to layer i + 1. Clearly, tree edges link vertices of adjacent layers. Now, consider a shortest path
Thus, in traversing the shortest path, each edge can reduce the layer difference between v and w by at most 1.
Let Cost(N) be the cost of N and Cost(OPT) be the cost of a social optimum. For the analysis of Cost(N), let Cost(v) be the cost paid by player v ∈ V in N. We have Cost(N) = v∈V Cost(v) . The cost incurred by v consists of the cost for building edges and Dist(v) , the sum of the shortest-path distances from v to all the other vertices in the equilibrium graph. Fix an arbitrary v 0 ∈ V. We prove
Consider the shortest-path tree T(v 0 ). For any vertex v ∈ V, let E v be the number of tree edges built by v in T(v 0 ). Vertex v 0 built only tree edges, while the other vertices may have built tree as well as non-tree edges. To prove Eq.
(1), we show for
To verify this inequality, we modify v's strategy as follows. Vertex v discards the non-tree edges it built formerly; it only builds the tree edges it laid out before and, additionally, builds an edge to v 0 . The new cost for building edges is α (E v It remains to analyze Dist(v 0 ). If α < 1, then there is a direct link between any pair of vertices, and hence Dist(v 0 ) ≤ n − 1. We obtain Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + 2n(n − 1), and the price of anarchy is bounded by 2, because Cost(OPT) ≥ α(n−1)+n(n−1). If α > n 2 , then we use the trivial bound Dist(v 0 ) ≤ (n − 1) 2 and Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + 2n(n − 1) 2 , and the price of anarchy is bounded by 4, because Cost(OPT) > α(n − 1) > n 2 (n − 1).
In the remainder of this proof, we assume 1 ≤ α ≤ n 2 . In this case, a social optimum is given by the star graph which incurs a cost of Cost(OPT) = α(n − 1) + 2(n − 1) 2 > α(n − 1) + n 2 for n ≥ 2 players. Let d be the depth of T(v 0 ), that is, d is the maximum layer number max v∈V (v) . If d ≤ 9, we are easily done. We have Dist(v 0 ) ≤ 9n and Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + 10n 2 , and the desired price of anarchy holds because Cost(OPT) > α(n − 1) + n 2 . Thus, in the following, we restrict ourselves to the case 
and hence
Next assume |V | < 2 3 n c . For any i with
contradicting the assumption that |V | < 
The bounds on d shown in Eqs. (3) and (4) are identical, because 15α n c = 15 α/n 1−c is equivalent to α = n 3c−1 , and this holds by the choice of c.
We finally determine the price of anarchy. We have Dist(v 0 ) ≤ (n − 1)15α/n c ≤ 15αn 1−c . Using Eq. (1), we obtain Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + 15αn 2−c + n 2 . The price of anarchy is bounded by
If α ≤ n, then the price of anarchy is bounded by 3 + 15α/n c < 15(1 + α/n c ) = 15(1 + n 2c−1 ) = 15(1 + (α 2 /n) 1/3 ), because the definition of c implies that n c = (αn) 1/3 . If α > n, then we use the fact that α(n − 1) + n 2 > αn. This holds because α ≤ n 2 . The price of anarchy is bounded by 3 + 15n 1−c < 15(1 + n 1−c ) = 15(1 + (n 2 /α) 1/3 ), using again the fact that n c = (αn) 1/3 .
The next theorem implies that the critical part in establishing a constant bound on the price of anarchy is the sum of the shortest-path distances between players. THEOREM 3.9. In any Nash equilibrium S, the total cost incurred by the players in building edges is bounded by twice the cost of the social optimum. There exists a shortest-path tree in the graph induced by s such that, for any player v, the number of non-tree edges built by v is bounded by 1 + (n − 1)/α . PROOF. Consider the graph G = (V, E) associated with S. Again, for v ∈ V, let Cost(v) be the cost incurred by v and let Dist(v) be the sum of the shortest-path distances from v to all the other vertices in V. Choose a vertex v 0 with minimum Distvalue among all vertices, that is, Dist(v 0 ) = min v∈V Dist(v) , and consider the shortestpath tree T(v 0 ). For any v ∈ V, let E v be the number of tree edges, and let E v be the number of non-tree edges built by v in T(v 0 ). The total cost incurred by the players in building edges is v∈V (E v + E v Suppose that player v's strategy, v = v 0 , is modified as follows. Agent v deletes its E v non-tree edges. It only builds the E v tree edges it laid out before and, additionally, builds an edge to v 0 . With this additional edge, the shortest-path distance from v to any vertex w is by at most one larger then the shortest-path distance from v 0 to w. Since v does not follow this strategy,
There is a total of n − 1 tree edges in T(v 0 ) and E v 0 = 0. Thus the total cost paid by the players in building edges is bounded by α(n − 1) + α(n − 1) + (n − 1) 2 , and this is at most twice the cost Cost(OPT) of a social optimum, because Cost(OPT) ≥ α(n − 1) + n(n − 1).
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
We give further characterizations of Nash equilibria. Our first contribution is to show that, for any n and α ≤ n/3, there exist transient Nash equilibria which are not trees. We then show that every Nash equilibrium which is a chordal graph is a transient Nash equilibrium. An undirected graph is chordal if every cycle of length at least four has a chord, that is, has an edge connecting two non-adjacent vertices on the cycle. Chordal graphs play a very important role in graph theory (see, e.g., [Distel 2000] ). Finally, we show that for α < n/2, every Nash equilibrium which is a tree must be a star.
THEOREM 4.1. For any integer n such that n = kl, where k ≥ 3 and l ≥ 1, and α = l, there exists a Nash equilibrium forming a non-tree chordal graph on n vertices. PROOF. We start by describing our non-tree chordal equilibrium graph. A (k, ) clique of stars is a clique with k vertices, where each vertex of the clique is a root of a star with vertices. A (6, 8) clique of stars is depicted in Figure 8 .
We prove that a (k, ) clique of stars is a Nash equilibrium when α = , assuming that the edges of each star are bought only by its root, and the clique edges are bought arbitrarily by one of their endpoints. . If x i does not buy one of these edges, the graph gets disconnected, and the cost of x i becomes infinity. Thus, these edges are necessary. Suppose that the edge (x i , x j ) is bought by x i , then x i is indifferent of buying or not buying the edge: without the edge, the distance to the star rooted at x j is at least 2, while it is 1 with the edge. The benefit from buying the edge is , which is also the cost of an edge. Clearly x i cannot benefit from buying an edge to a leaf of another star, say y k p , since α ≥ 1, and the benefit is exactly 1. Thus, x j has no incentive to change its strategy, and we conclude that G( S) is an equilibrium graph.
We finish the proof of Theorem 4.1. For every n with n = kl, where k ≥ 3 and l ≥ 1, we have a (k, ) clique of stars that forms a non-tree equilibrium for α = l.
THEOREM 4.3. Let α > 1 and N be a Nash equilibrium that has a cycle in the associated graph G = (V, E). If G is chordal, then N is transient.
PROOF. Consider an arbitrary cycle of length three in G. On this cycle, considering directed edges, either (a) each of the three cycle vertices has exactly one incoming and one outgoing cycle edge or (b) there exists one vertex that has two outgoing edges. In case (a), we name the vertices on the cycle v 0 , v 1 , and v 2 , starting at an arbitrary vertex and then following the cycle orientation. In case (b), let v 0 be the vertex with two outgoing cycle edges and name the remaining two vertices such that there are oriented edges (v 0 , v 1 ) and (v 1 , v 2 ). This leads to the configuration shown in Figure 9 . The edge between v 0 and v 2 can be oriented in two ways.
Let V 12 be the set of vertices v, v = v 0 , that are directly linked to both v 1 and v 2 , that is, V 12 = {v ∈ V | v = v 0 and {v, v i } ∈ E for i = 1, 2)}. Furthermore, let W be the set of vertices w ∈ V such that a shortest path from v 1 to w uses edge (v 1 , v 2 ), and any other path from v 1 to w that does not use (v 1 , v 2 ) is strictly longer than a shortest path. Obviously, (v 1 , v 2 ) is the first edge on the shortest paths from v 1 to vertices w. Furthermore, W and V 12 are disjoint. Set W must contain at least α vertices, since otherwise, v 1 could delete edge (v 1 , v 2 ) and instead use the edges between v 1 and v 0 and between v 0 and v 2 to reach v 2 on the path to w ∈ W. This would lower v 1 's cost for building edges by α, while its shortest-paths cost would increase by less than α.
Let V 1 be the set of vertices v ∈ V, v / ∈ V 12 ∪ {v 0 , v 2 }, that are directly linked to v 1 . Formally, V 1 = {v ∈ V | v / ∈ V 12 ∪ {v 0 , v 2 } and edge {v, v 1 } ∈ E}. We next prove that for any v ∈ V 1 and w ∈ W, a shortest path from v to w is at least one edge longer than a shortest path from v 1 to w. Assume that this were not the case. Let v ∈ V 1 be a vertex such that the desired statement is violated for some vertices in W. Among those candidates, let w ∈ W be the one having the smallest distance from v 2 . Let P v be a shortest path from v to w and P v 1 be a shortest path from v 1 to w. Path P v does not use (v 1 , v 2 ), since otherwise, P v would be one edge longer than P v 1 . Path P v 1 does use (v 1 , v 2 ) by the definition of W. Path P v cannot be shorter then P v 1 ; otherwise, the path consisting of the edge between v 1 and v, followed by P v , would be a shortest path from v 1 to w, contradicting the fact that w ∈ W. Hence, P v 1 and P v have the same length. All the vertices of P v 1 , except for v 1 , belong to W. Therefore, P v 1 and P v are edge disjoint. If they were a common suffix S, then the first vertex of S would be a vertex in W closer to v 2 , violating the desired statement. Paths P v 1 and P v each have a length of at least two, since otherwise, w = v 2 , and hence v ∈ V 12 .
Consider the following cycle C that has a length of at least 5. Starting at v 1 , we follow the edge to v, then traverse the path P v to w, and finally traverse the edges of P v 1 to reach v 1 . We argue that neither v 1 nor v has a chord to any other vertex on C. A chord between v 1 and another vertex on C would imply a shortest path between v 1 and w that does not use (v 1 , v 2 ), contradicting the definition of W. If there were a chord between v and v 2 , then v ∈ V 12 . If there were a chord between v and any other vertex on C, this would imply the existence of a path form v to w that is shorter then P v . Using this property of v and v 1 , we are able to identify a cycle C of length at least four that has no chord. We start at vertex v 1 , follow the edge to v, and traverse the first edge of P v . Let w 1 be the vertex reached. From w 1 , we traverse the chord that skips the largest number of edges on the arc of C between w 1 and v 2 . If there is no chord at w 1 , we traverse the next edge of C leaving w 1 . Let w 2 be the vertex reached. We proceed in the same way as in vertex w 1 . In general, when at vertex w i , we follow the chord that skips the largest number of edges on the cycle arc between w i and v 2 . If there is no such chord, we traverse the next cycle edge. Eventually, we reach v 2 and can complete C by traversing the edge between v 2 and v 1 . The existence of C is a contradiction to the fact that the undirected graph underlying our Nash equilibrium is chordal.
We conclude that, indeed, for any v ∈ V 1 and w ∈ W, a shortest path from v to w is at least one edge longer than a shortest path from v 1 to w. Using this property, we can show that N is transient. If vertex v ∈ V builds an edge to v 2 , its cost can only decrease, because the shortest-path distances between v and w ∈ W decrease by at least |W| ≥ α, while the cost for building edges increases by α. The fact that v did not build this edge in N implies that |W| = α, and N is transient, because v can alter its strategy without changing its cost. An edge (v, v 2 ) does not change the shortest-path distances from other vertices v ∈ V 1 , v = v 1 , to vertices w ∈ W: if v uses (v, v 2 ) on a shortest path, it needs at least two edges to reach v 2 , and this is also the number of edges to reach v 2 in N.
The single-player changes are as follows. Agents v ∈ V 1 one after the other introduce an edge (v, v 2 ). The changer's cost does not change. At this point, we have reached a non-equilibrium state N : agent v 0 can delete edge (v 0 , v 1 ), saving a cost of α. We finally show that only the shortest-path distance to v 1 increases by one. In the original equilibrium N, consider a shortest path from v 0 to some vertex w = v 1 that uses edge (v 0 , v 1 ). After v 1 , the shortest path visits a vertex v ∈ V 12 ∪ V 1 . The subpath (v 0 , v 1 ) followed by the edge between v 1 and v in N can be replaced by the edges between v 0 and v 2 and between v 2 and v in N . If v ∈ V 1 , the last edge was newly introduced. THEOREM 4.4. For α < n/2, the star is the only tree which is an equilibrium graph.
PROOF. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is an equilibrium graph which is a tree but not a star. It is well known that any tree has a centroid vertex whose removal yields a forest with components of size at most n/2. Let v be such a centroid vertex, and let u be a leaf at depth d ≥ 2. It is easy to see that since the removal of v yields a forest with components of size at most n/2, there must be at least n/2 vertices whose shortest path to u passes through v. Buying the edge (u, v) would save n(d−1)/2 to u, and thus we get that α ≥ n(d − 1)/2 ≥ n/2, a contradiction.
A WEIGHTED NETWORK CREATION GAME
So far, we have considered an unweighted network creation game in which all players incur the same traffic. We now study a weighted game in which player u sends a traffic amount of w uv > 0 to player v, with u = v. In the cost of player u, the shortest-path distance between u and v is multiplied by w uv . Let W = (w uv ) u,v be the resulting n × n traffic matrix. We use w min = min u =v w uv to denote smallest traffic entry and w max = max u =v w uv to denote the largest one. Let W = n u=1 n v=1 w uv be the sum of the traffic values. We extend the upper bound of Section 3.2 to the weighted case. The following theorem is a generalization of Theorem 3.7. In the unweighted case, we have w min = 1, and the bounds given in the next theorem are identical to that of Theorem 3.7, up to constant factors. PROOF. Let N be any Nash equilibrium. We extend the proof of Theorem 3.7 and first develop a modified bound on Cost(N). We assume n > 2, since otherwise, the price of anarchy is obviously 1.
Consider the equilibrium graph G = (V, E) given by N and fix an arbitrary player v 0 ∈ V. We use the shortest-path tree T(v 0 ) rooted at v 0 , which is defined in the same way as in the unweighted case. We simply ignore traffic weights and just consider the edges in E to identify the structure of T(v 0 ). Again, let E v be the number of tree edges built by player v ∈ V, and let d be the depth of T(v 0 ). We have To verify this inequality, we simply observe that if v decides to build only its tree edges, deleting the non-tree edges, and additionally builds an edge to v 0 , its cost is given by the right-hand side of the inequality. Summing the costs over all vertices, we obtain Since Cost(OPT) ≥ α(n − 1) + W, this establishes the upper bounds of 60(1 + n) and 2 + 3n in parts (a) and (b) of the theorem. We can also establish part (c) of the theorem because, if α ≥ w max n 2 , we have Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + n 3 w max and Cost(OPT) ≥ n 2 (n − 1)w max .
If α < w min , then there is a direct link between any pair of players, and the price of anarchy is bounded by 1, because Cost(OPT) ≥ αn(n − 1)/2 + W. In the following, we assume w min ≤ α ≤ w max n 2 and develop a refined bound on d. If d ≤ 9, then the price of anarchy is bounded by 12. Therefore, we assume d ≥ 10. To prove part (a) of the theorem, we determine c, 1/3 ≤ c ≤ 1, such that α = w min n 3c−1 , and let V = {v ∈ V | (v) ≤ 
By the choice of c, the bounds on d given in Eqs. (6) and (7) To prove part (b) of the theorem, we finally study the case that α is in the range w min n 2 < α < w max n 2 . Here we use a different estimate on d. Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + 3 α/w min W.
If α(n − 1) ≤ W, then the price of anarchy is bounded by 2 + 3 √ α/w min . If α(n − 1) > W, the price of anarchy is bounded by 2 + 3W/( √ αw min (n − 1)).
COST SHARING
We study the effect of cost sharing where players can pay for a fraction of an edge. An edge exists if the total contribution is at least α. We first show that the bounds on the price of anarchy developed in Sections 3.2 and 5 essentially carry over. We then prove that there exist strict Nash equilibria containing cycles in which the cost is split evenly among players. PROOF. We first show part (a). Using the terminology of the proof of Theorem 3.7, we can show that for any v ∈ V, Cost(v) ≤ α(E v + 1) + Dist(v 0 ) + n − 1. To see this inequality, we modify v's strategy such that it removes its cost contributions to nontree edges. Agent v only maintains its contributions to tree edges and, additionally, builds an edge to v 0 , the vertex for which we consider the corresponding shortest-path tree. The cost under this modified strategy is bounded by the expression previously given. Summing over all v, we obtain Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + nDist(v 0 ) + (n − 1) 2 . We can then bound Dist(v 0 ) in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.7.
For the proof of part (b), using the terminology of the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can show Cost(N) ≤ 2α(n − 1) + (d + 1)W. We can extend the arguments presented for the scenario without cost sharing to bound d in a similar way. THEOREM 6.2. For n > 6 and α in the range 1 6 n 2 + n < α < 1 2 n 2 − n, there exist strict Nash equilibria with n players that contain cycles and in which the cost is split evenly among players.
PROOF. Consider a cycle of n vertices v 1 , . . . , v n . There is an edge between v i and v i+1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and an edge between v n and v 1 . We associate a player with each of the n vertices. Every player pays a cost of α/2 for each of the two edges adjacent to him, incurring a total cost of α for building edges. We show that this cycle represents a strict Nash equilibrium for the given range of α. Since the strategies of players v i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are symmetric in i, it suffices to prove that there is no strictly better strategy for v 1 . We first analyze the cost of v 1 . There are two vertices at each of the distances 1 up to n 2 − 1. If n is even, there is one vertex at distance 
= α + n 2 n 2 + 1 − n 2 ((n + 1) mod 2).
